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The Eternal Divide?:  
History and International Relations 
 
 
The eternal divide? 
 
Like most long-running interdisciplinary relationships, the liaison between International 
Relations (IR) and history has taken many turns. In some respects, history has always been a 
core feature of the international imagination. On both sides of the Atlantic, leading figures in 
the discipline such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight and Stanley Hoffman 
employed history as a means of illuminating their research. Indeed, Wight (1966) made 
searching through international history the sine qua non of international theory, the best that 
could be hoped for in a discipline without a core problematique of its own. Although 
seemingly banished to the margins of the discipline by the emergence of behaviouralism and 
the association of ‘real theory’ with deductive, nomological methods, history never really 
went away as an important feature of IR’s toolkit. Rather, history became part of a broader 
tug of war between ‘classical’ approaches which retained history as their central locomotive 
and IR’s neo-positivist laboriticians, who saw history as providing the main ammunition for 
their experiments. As this essay shows, history has been employed, albeit unevenly, 
throughout the discipline. And given this, the rise – or reconvening – of historically-oriented 
research programmes such as constructivism, neo-classical realism and the English School 
should be seen less as a novel breakthrough than as a return to business as usual.  
 
However, there is a tension which remains unresolved in the relationship between history and 
IR, one which is long-standing and which reappears with regularity, even in those texts which 
explicitly bestride the IR-history frontier. The issue is revealed in a passage from one of the 
best known of these texts (Elman and Elman, 2001: 7): 
  
Political scientists are more likely to look to the past as a way of supporting or 
discrediting theoretical hypothesis, while historians are more likely to be interested in 
past international events for their own sake. Although political scientists might turn to 
the distant past, the study of ‘deep’ history is relevant to their research objectives only 
insofar as it enables them to generate, test or refine theory. By contrast, for the 




Later in the book, the authors make this distinction even more starkly (Elman and Elman, 
2001: 35), 
 
Political scientists are not historians, nor should they be. There are real and enduring 
epistemological and methodological differences that divide the two groups, and there 
is great value in recognising, maintaining and honouring these distinctions. 
 
These passages point the way towards a clear division of labour between theory-building 
political scientists and chronicling historians, a first-order demarcation on which other 
contributors to Bridges and Boundaries overlay a number of second-order distinctions: 
methods (a focus on secondary sources vs. primary sources); aims (identification of 
regularities, mechanisms and continuities vs. the highlighting of contingency, ambiguity and 
change); orientation (nomothetic vs. idiographic); sensibility (parsimony vs. complexity); 
scope conditions (analytic vs. temporal/spatial); notions of causation (transhistorical vs. 
context specific); levels of analysis (structure vs. agency) and so on. As a result, a list of 
essential differences are formed in which one discipline (IR/political science) acts as binary 
opposite for and, more often than not, coloniser of the other (history). 
 
This essay questions the grounds for the construction of this ‘eternal divide’ between history 
and IR. The argument presented is straightforward: despite the surface-level closeness of the 
relationship between IR and history, much IR scholarship is predicated on a view of history 
caught between two equally unsatisfactory stools. On the one hand, history becomes a pre-
determined site for the empirical verification of abstract claims. In this sense, history serves 
as ‘scripture’, as the application of timeless ‘lessons’ and inviolate rules removed from their 
context and applied to ill-fitting situations: the ‘lessons of appeasement’ become a shorthand 
for the necessity of confronting dictatorial regimes across time and place; the US retreat from 
Vietnam is invoked to halt talk of withdrawal in Iraq; the Reagan years are employed to 
support the idea that ultimate victory in the ‘war on terror’ rests on the deployment of 
overwhelming US military power married to the promotion – by force if necessary – of 
democratic ideals around the world. Such a move runs counter to the avowed aims of the 
historical (re)turn in IR: assuming due regard for particularity, context and complexity. In 
fact, it promotes a selection bias in case-studies in which history is reduced to a role, however 
well disguised, in which it is already filled-in as the fulfilment of IR’s theoretical 
abstractions. In short, history becomes an uncontested background narrative to be coded 
 3 
within pre-existing theoretical categories (Lustick, 1996). And as such, this approach is little 
more than the continuation of ahistoricism by other means.  
 
A second, equally prominent, tendency in IR scholarship is to see history as the ‘if only’ 
realm of uncertainty (Versailles less punitive, Bin Laden assassinated before 9/11, Pearl 
Harbour never taken place) a ‘butterfly’ of contingent hiccups upon which IR theorists 
provide ill-fitting maps – maps which apparently reveal the distortions of their ideological 
prisms rather than the shape of history itself. Curiously, despite a sense in which this turn 
seeks to foster a kind of ‘pure history’, it is also ahistorical in that it fetishises the particular 
and the exceptional, failing to see how historical events are part of broader processes, 
sequences and plots which provide a shape – however difficult to discern – within historical 
development itself. The result of the ‘if only’ school of history is a reduction of the past to a 
‘pick and mix’ sweet shop which is raided in order to satisfy the tastes and tropes of the 
researcher. Significantly, it is also a vision of history contrary to how the majority of 
historians themselves conduct their research and characterise their discipline.  
 
The existence of these two forms of ahistoricism – history as scripture and as butterfly – are 
forged by the working practices of IR scholarship itself. Most mainstream approaches adopt a 
form of ‘history as scripture’, using history in order to code findings, mine data or as a source 
of post factum explanations (Smith, 1999; Isacoff, 2002). Most post-positivist approaches – 
particularly post-structuralism – assume a form of the latter, using history as a means of 
disrupting prevalent power-knowledge nexuses (e.g. Ashley, 1989; Walker, 1988; Vaughan-
Williams, 2005). Few IR scholars spend sufficient time asking what it is we mean when we 
talk about history. Indeed, both (neo)positivists and post-positivists have generated an 
artificial divide in which second-order noise has substituted for first-order enquiry. The 
central aim of this essay is to delve beneath the surface of these debates in order to 
demonstrate how a historical mode of explanation based on context and narrative, allied to a 
social scientific mode of enquiry centred on eventfulness and ideal-typification, can reveal 
the necessary co-implication of each enterprise. This move, it is claimed, both fulfils the 
historical (re)turn in IR and adds theoretical value to it. The argument develops in three 
stages. First, the essay offers a brief overview of the relationship between history and IR, 
pulling out a number of tensions in the ways in which IR theorists approach historical 
research. The second section broadens this argument into a discussion of the relationship 
between social science and history more generally, arguing that, in parallel to IR, social 
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scientists and historians have exhibited a tendency to talk past each other, generating a 
number of powerful, if artificial, distinctions which have served to occlude the many overlaps 
between the two enterprises. The third part outlines the ways in which context, eventfulness, 
narrative and ideal-typification serve as tools for tacking more effectively between history 
and the social sciences, including IR.  
 
 
Scripture and Butterfly: History and International Relations 
 
Although there are – and have been – many encounters between historians and IR theorists, 
history has often served as a passive backdrop for theorist’s experiments. Indeed, as one of 
IR’s most celebrated quantifiers puts it (Bueno de Mesquita in Smith, 1999: 7), ‘for the social 
scientist, history is primarily a laboratory by which to test both their claims about how 
variables are associated with each other and their propositions about causation’. In general, 
history is often assumed to be someway removed from the menu of mainstream IR, best 
captured by Waltzian neo-realism and Keohane-inspired neoliberal institutionalism. As is 
well known, both of these approaches work within an assumption of anarchy as containing a 
transhistorical logic. In this sense, the strength of third-image approaches, it is supposed, lies 
in the assumption of a continuous structural context to international relations (anarchy) 
which, in turn, generates a number of derivative logics – a self-help system, the need for 
states to prioritize survival, a recurring security dilemma and the mechanism of the balance of 
power. Because anarchy stands as a constant structural condition, so the international sphere 
appears as a continuous, almost static, holding pen for ‘actually existing’ international 
relations. In turn, this means that IR scholarship is – or should be – primarily concerned with 
mapping the ceaseless struggle for survival (as in neorealism) or the conditions for 
cooperation (as in neoliberalism) which take place within a timeless and spaceless anarchical 
system. And much of the criticism of neo-neo theories, particularly neorealism (e.g. Ruggie, 
1986; Hall and Kratochwil, 1993; Schroeder, 1994),  is made on the basis that it lacks a 
transformative logic and, as a consequence, is unable to explain processes of change – 
especially systems change – over time. 
 
If the ahistoricism of neo-neo approaches is a commonly held assumption, equally 
widespread is the idea that historical sensitivity is something that has become a core feature 
of IR scholarship only relatively recently. In fact, a concern with temporality has long been a 
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feature of international studies. Indeed, it is possible to discern a classical tradition in IR 
theory, perhaps most obvious in figures such as Niebuhr, Carr and Morgenthau, which 
intimately associated the craft of international theory with deep immersion in history 
(professionally so in Carr’s case). Of course, these scholars had quite different views of 
history. While Niebuhr saw history as contingent, diverse and, in his more Augustinian 
moments, sinful, Morgenthau (like George Kennan) argued that history was singular but 
repetitive, thereby delivering an ‘ordered register’ of practical knowledge for the prudential 
policy maker to learn from (Smith, 1999; ch. 4). Even within the classical tradition, therefore, 
can be found contrasting views of history: the tragic perennialism of Niebuhr alongside the 
contingent discontinuity of Morgenthau, Carr and Kennan. But despite their surface-level 
differences, these scholars shared a common interest in historical research, whether this was 
conducted in order to reveal the ceaseless precariousness of international politics, or as a 
means of generating practical advice for the prince.  
 
In this sense, therefore, the neo-neo hold on IR in which ‘proper theory’ became entwined 
with deductive, nomological methods discrete from ‘thick description’ could be seen as an 
unwelcome interlude in a much longer, more fruitful, association between IR and history. 
However, there is a problem with this narrative. Even during the high-water mark of the neo-
neo grip on IR theory, few advocates of either sensibility denied the importance of history as 
a means of testing their approach.
1
 In this way, Colin and Miriam Elman (1995; 2008) found 
neo-realism to be perfectly compatible with historical research, while figures as varied as 
Robert Gilpin (1981), John Mearsheimer (2003) and Arthur Eckstein (2006) have carried out 
major pieces of historical research aiming to validate, fill-in or challenge the Waltzian frame. 
In a similar vein, Robert Keohane (1984), Lisa Martin (1992) and others have applied 
historical analysis to a neoliberal institutionalist research program in order to draw out its 
explanatory potential. In this way, the return of classical liberalism, the rise of neoclassical 
realism and constructivism, and the reconvening of the English School mark less the 
emergence of a historical turn in IR, but more an acceleration and deepening of trends already 
present in the discipline. History has always served as a tool for testing the validity of 
theoretical positions, and mainstream scholarship is perfectly content to use history as a 
barometer or litmus test for adjudicating between rival schemas.  
                                                 
1
 The partial exception here is behaviouralism as exemplified, for example, by the Correlates 
of War Project, although even in this case the programme made extensive use of cliometric 
techniques which were themselves a means of coding historical ‘data’.  
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However, although mainstream approaches – particularly neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism – do employ historical research, it is not clear that the latter serves much 
purpose in their accounts. Although ‘history’ as a point of data collection may be present, 
historicism – an understanding of the contingent, disruptive, constitutive impact of local 
events, particularities and discontinuities – is absent. As such, these approaches illustrate the 
ahistoricism of seeing ‘history as scripture’ – abstracting concepts such as ‘anarchy’, ‘the 
balance of power’ or ‘self-help’ out of their particular instantiations and reifying them as 
timeless analytical (and ultimately as ontological) entities. In this way, neo-neo approaches 
are home to what we might call a ‘continuist mystique’ in which history is not considered on 
its own terms but ransacked in order to explain the present. Thus, the contest between Athens 
and Sparta is transplanted to the Cold War in order to elucidate the stand-off between the 
United States and the Soviet Union; all wars, whether they be guerrilla insurgencies or total 
conflicts, are explained by international anarchy; and all political units – city-states, nomadic 
tribes, empires, nation-states and transnational alliances – are functionally undifferentiated. 
What John Hobson (2002) describes as a ‘gigantic optical illusion’ generates an isomorphic 
homology of social kinds. Neo-neo approaches, therefore, suffer problems associated with 
any theory which begins from a general abstraction (such as the timeless logic of anarchy). 
Such a view will by necessity take a view of the detail, the mess, the contingencies and 
excesses of history which condemns it to the status of under-labourer. If the researcher starts 
with a picture of the whole which is already filled-in, they will see conforming details rather 
than possible alternatives. To all intents and purposes, this form of research is a type of 
motivated bias, a cognitive disability to recognise historical anomalies and discrepancies 
which, in turn, generates an apparently unbridgeable gap between theoretical assertions and 
historical analysis (Lebow, 2010). 
 
There is an alternative, of course, to such approaches – to revel in the contingency, accident 
and indeterminacy which are constant companions to world history. Nick Vaughan-Williams 
(2005: 117), for example, favours an historical epistemology which seeks not to ‘resolve 
history’ but to see it as an ‘open problem’, a realm of ‘radical uncertainty’ which remains 
constantly ‘out of reach’. Critiquing the ‘interpretative closure’ of mainstream IR, Vaughan-
Williams (2005: 118) argues for the need to destabilise and contest existing accounts of ‘the 
historical record’. In this view, history is not a means by which to assess truth claims, but a 
space concerned with ‘dispersal, difference and alterity across time and space’. Vaughan-
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Williams employs the Derridean notion of différance to illustrate the ways in which historical 
meanings occupy a space in-between ‘this’ and ‘that’. As such, history is always ungraspable 
and its meanings always deferred – there are no fixed points of historical settlement; instead 
history becomes an ‘undecideable infinity of possible truths’ (2005: 129). Rather than use 
history in order to verify pre-existing schemas, Vaughan-Williams prefers to see history as a 
tool of destabilisation which can reveal the distortions of ontopolitical positions. In short, for 
Vaughan-Williams, history is a ‘butterfly’ of contingent hiccups without shape, form or 
reason, a site of dissidence which can unmask hegemonic readings and, thereby, disrupt 
prevalent power-knowledge nexuses.  
 
Vaughan-Williams is part of a broader field of post-structuralist scholars in IR, including Rob 
Walker (1988), David Campbell (1998) and Richard Ashley (1989), who see history as far 
removed from mainstream accounts of post-factum closure. Rather, for these scholars, history 
is inherently contestable, unstable and disruptive. As such, researchers need to shift from an 
understanding of history as delivering ‘essential truths’, ‘timeless categories’ and 
‘unchanging reality’ to one which sees history as impermanent, contested and contingent 
(Walker, 1988). For these scholars, history is not a realm of continuity but one of 
incommensurable difference, particularity and dissent (Campbell, 1998), an ‘irruption of 
contingency’ which serves as an invitation to permanent provocation and as a means of 
unsettling suprahistorical, logocentric accounts of ‘history as necessity’ (Ashley, 1989).  
 
The benefits of such an approach are clear – in terms of nuance, detail and sensitivity, 
historical research of this type is unrivalled. And certainly, a number of techniques employed 
by scholars occupying this broad persuasion – genealogy, multi-perspectivism, agonism, 
intertextuality – are powerful tools for questioning taken-for-granted assumptions about both 
the present and the past. However, such an approach also has its difficulties. At the very least, 
post-structuralist understandings of history run the risk of ‘overdetermination’ – the provision 
of a laundry list of causes that includes all sorts of weak or insignificant factors. Perhaps 
more importantly, by stressing contingency, accident and particularity, there is a possibility 
of omitting bigger, more important commonalities. As this essay goes on to explore in more 
detail, where the neo-neo conception of history irons out discontinuities by creating 
isomorphic transhistorical categories, post-structuralist approaches obscure the sense in 
which history is a social process, one in which historical events, dramas and processes are 
part of broader concatenations which provide a shape – however difficult to discern – within 
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historical development. Just as mainstream approaches make history a singular realm of 
certainty and regularity, so post-structuralist approaches assume history to be a singular realm 
of difference and instability. As such, where the former fetishise general abstractions, the 
latter fetishise the particular. Or to put this another way, where the ‘history as scripture’ 
approach is historical without being historicist, the ‘history as butterfly’ approach is 
historicist without being historical, focusing on deconstruction without reconstructing 
meaningful analytical narratives. Neither provides much help in terms of building durable 
links between history and IR theory. And neither provides much help in terms of generating 
theoretically appealing and empirically rich accounts of events, processes and dynamics in 
world politics. 
 
In many ways, ‘middle-way’ approaches to IR theory claim the closest association with 
historical research. Indeed, it could be argued that the English School has the most intimate 
association with history of any of the major approaches to international relations. Several 
members of the British Committee on the Theory of International Affairs – the institutional 
font of the approach – were practicing historians (including Martin Wight and Herbert 
Butterfield), while many contemporary advocates of the English School (such as Barry 
Buzan, Richard Little, Hidemi Suganami and Eddie Keene) continue to play an active role in 
bridging the theory-history divide (e.g. Buzan and Little, 1996, 2001; Suganami, 1998, 2008; 
Keene, 2008). However, even the English School has a tendency to replicate core features of 
this divide. On the one hand, a number of English School theorists see history as ‘useful 
knowledge’, serving as a means of illuminating concrete puzzles in world politics. But they 
remain suspicious to the point of hostility at attempts to capture history within broader 
explanatory frameworks or, indeed, to generate accounts of ‘final causes’ which, Herbert 
Butterfield believed, belonged to God alone (Hall, 2002). This understanding of history as a 
necessarily limited realm stands some distance away from the attempts by figures such as 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little to test the utility of ‘international system’ as a transhistorical 
theoretical toolkit (Buzan and Little, 2001) or to interrogate the impact of globalization on the 
institutional architecture of international society (Buzan, 2004). As such, although there is 
certainly an underlying historical sensibility to English School theory, there is no consistent 
philosophy of history or historical method that can be clearly associated with the approach 
(Linklater and Suganami, 2007).  
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It is equally difficult to establish a distinctly constructivist mode of historical enquiry. While 
there are many strains of constructivist IR, all variants reject a neo-neo instrumentalist 
rational actor model in which actors’ interests are pre-determined and universal across time 
and space. As such, constructivism is propelled towards accounts of time and place 
specificity, context and change which render the approach necessarily historical in 
orientation. Chris Reus-Smit (2008) argues that constructivists tend to adopt an interpretivist 
approach to historical research, giving special attention to processes of social change, 
‘historically voiceless individuals and groups’, and the role historians themselves play in 
constructing history. However, there is little distinctiveness about the theory-history 
relationship in constructivist studies bar, as with the English School, a broad commitment to 
historical research as a means of explicating theoretical work. As such, it is nigh-on 
impossible to pick out a discrete philosophy of history associated with constructivist IR – 
there is a degree of fuzziness about the relationship between history and constructivism 
beyond a general exhortation that such a relationship is important.  
 
Of course, this broad-brush survey of contemporary IR theory is necessarily crude. A number 
of approaches beyond the standard paradigms such as historical sociology (e.g. Hobden and 
Hobson, 2002), conceptual history (e.g. Bartleson, 1995) and intellectual history (e.g. Bell, 
2009) have sought to combine rich historical insights with major theoretical statements. As 
such, this essay does not seek to establish a complete account of the relationship between IR 
theory and history. Nor should the metaphor of ‘scripture’ and ‘butterfly’ be seen as an 
attempt to provide a total or pure form of categorisation. Rather, the goals here are more 
limited – to (over)simplify the relationship between history and IR as caught between 
‘scripture’ and ‘butterfly’ in order to tease out a number of issues which lie submerged 
beneath the surface of existing debates. And in this regard, there are three initial points to 
note. First, from mainstream approaches comes a sense of history as ‘scripture’, as context-
less data-set or passive record through which abstract formulas, concepts and hypotheses can 
be assessed. As noted above, this approach is deeply flawed, reducing history to a 
monochrome flatland by which to confirm or, at best, tweak theoretical claims. Second, from 
the radical historiography of post-positivism comes a sense of history as ‘butterfly’ – a 
contingent realm of ifs and maybes which reveals not truth but the ideological disposition of 
the researcher. This too is a flawed approach, offering an account of historical disruption 
without indicating the ways in which historical events form part of broader, more intelligible 
shapes. Finally, middle-way approaches, although immersed in historical forms of 
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explanation, offer little clarity when it comes to understanding exactly what the relationship 
between history and theory building is or should be. Overall, therefore, the diverse plumage 
of contemporary IR theory is matched by the diversity of ways in which the discipline 
approaches historical research. From mainstream approaches comes an over-emphasis on 
continuity and incompatible analogies; from post-positivism comes an over-reliance on 
history as the accumulation of chance and coincidence. Contra both these understandings, 
what is required is an idea of history not as cause or chance, but a conceptualisation of 
history as cause and chance. Before this approach is sketched out more fully, it is worth 
looking at the ways in the history/theory binary in IR is replicated more generally in the 
social sciences.  
 
 
Scripture and Butterfly Redux: History and Social Science 
 
‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’ (History as it essentially was). Leopold Von Ranke 
 
‘History is a science, no less and no more’. J.M. Bury 
 
‘Historia magistra vitae’ (History is life’s teacher). Cicero 
 
‘The art of history is always the art of narrative’. G.M. Trevelyan   
 
‘History is not a narrative of events. The historian’s difficult task is to explain what 
happened’. Christopher Hill 
 
‘Studying history, my friends is no joke … to study history means submitting to chaos 
and nevertheless retaining faith in order and meaning’. Herman Hesse  
 
‘History is a nightmare from which I am trying to escape’. James Joyce 
 
 
There is no shortage of ways to think about history: as definitive record, as science, as 
teacher, as art, as narrative, as happening, as chaos, even as nightmare. Perhaps one of the 
most common ways to understand historical research is to see the enterprise as free from 
theoretical speculations, as the narration, chronicling or description of ‘what happened next’, 
the tracing of how one-thing-followed-another in the unfolding of events so contingent as to 
be unrepeatable. In this understanding, tides of history have been turned on the minutest of 
details: the crux of Cleopatra’s nose; a monkey’s bite on King Alexander of Greece; 
Trotsky’s fever contracted while shooting ducks in 1923 during the midst of a struggle with 
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Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev over the direction of the Bolshevik revolution.
2
 Certainly, this 
view contains a degree of force. Indeed, a number of historians themselves remain suspicious, 
even hostile, to attempts at theorising history. As John Lewis Gaddis (2001: 302) notes, 
‘when theories are right, they generally confirm the obvious. When they move beyond the 
obvious, they are usually wrong.’ If historians do seek to generate broad findings out of their 
archival burrowing, fieldwork and associated practices, it is argued, they form only the most 
approximate of representations – the ordering of historical complexity into some kind of 
rational mess. Many historians are keen to emphasise that a central difference between their 
work and that of social scientists is that they do not seek to bend reality in order to confirm to 
pre-existing theoretical scripts. As such, if historical theory appears, it is embedded within 
overarching narratives rather than serving as a means to confirm pre-existing theoretical 
dispositions. If historians generalise, it is from rather than to the particular (Gaddis, 1996). 
And as a result, history becomes yoked to the particular and the contingent – the butterflies 
which take human development down one path and not another.  
 
If this is one – perhaps the – common understanding of how history differs fundamentally 
from social science, there is an equally influential understanding of the distinctiveness of 
social science told from the other side of the ‘eternal divide’. Witness, for example, a 
diverting statement on the subject made by William Robinson (2003), a prominent macro-
sociologist. Robinson opens his book on transnational conflicts with an evocative story of the 
author gazing upon a mural in a major city in Latin America. For Robinson, the ‘real mural’ 
only becomes apparent from the ‘proper perspective’ – the other side of street. At this point, 
Robinson claims, the array of squiggles, colour and mess begins to take on a coherent form, 
first into recognisable patterns (half way across the street) and finally into a ‘big picture’: the 
macro-structural whole. Using this story as a metaphor for conducting his history-from-on-
high of transnational conflicts in Latin America, Robinson argues (2003: 1), perhaps fairly 
startlingly, that ‘the greater the level of abstraction in our analysis, the greater the historical 
explanation we will provide.’  
 
                                                 
2
 As Trotsky put it, ‘one can foresee a revolution or a war, but it is impossible to foresee the 
consequences of an autumn shooting trip for wild ducks.’ Bertrand Russell takes this point to 
the extreme by arguing that the existence of the United States depended on the liaison 
between Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn. Had this not happened, Russell argued, England 
would have remained Catholic and accepted the Papal ruling on the New World, leaving 
North America to the Spanish. On these examples – and more – see Carr (1967).  
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To some extent, Robinson’s stance should be both familiar and comfortable to many social 
scientists. After all, macro-sociology of the type promoted by Robinson takes as its primary 
role the identification of determinant causal processes, chains and configurations that, to a 
great extent, appear out of the control and purview of individuals. In other words, macro-
sociology is geared towards study of principia media – determinant structural forces that act 
as the underlying locomotives of historical development. In this sense, Robinson should be 
right: our level of detachment (or abstraction) enables us to make sense of the historical 
whole. However, if we start thinking of Robinson’s metaphor less as an analogy and more as 
an actual statement about how to conduct historical research, then problems begin to emerge. 
On one level, Robinson may be right that, from a distance, we can see the whole of the mural: 
its patterns, its contours, its overarching shape. But what do we miss? To some extent, 
everything. Mostly, of course, we miss the detail: the mural’s array of shapes, colours and 
textures. But this array is not just mess, at least not like that of a teenager’s room or an 
academic’s office. After all, there are enormous complexities, contingencies and excesses 
which Robinson’s broad view necessarily leaves out, a point raised evocatively by Robert 
Nisbet (1969: 240-241): 
   
History in any substantive sense is plural. It is diverse, multiple, and particular. There 
 have been innumerable histories since the first history of the first human group 
 began … not only are there many histories, there are many chronologies, many 
 times … many histories, many areas, many times! The mind boggles at the task of 
 encapsulating such diversity within any empirically clear formula or synthesis. It 
 cannot be done. 
 
 
What Robinson’s metaphor reveals, therefore, is a broader debate about appropriate levels of 
abstraction and, in turn, one about methods of historical and social scientific enquiry. Two 
points in particular are worth highlighting. First is the sense that social science must be 
parsimonious when it encounters historical ‘stuff’. In this understanding of the social science-
history relationship, theorists must skip over the intricacies of historical events – the latter is 
covered sufficiently by theoretical axioms or simplified radically in order for theoretical 
positions to retain their coherence. To put this another way, theorists are ‘lumpers’ to be 
contrasted with historical ‘splitters’ – the former are concerned with overarching macro-
schemas just as the latter audit the micro-details which Immanuel Wallerstein once described, 
or derided, as empirical ‘dust’. However, the lumper/splitter distinction is a partial, often 
misleading, picture of the theory-history relationship. Although some historians do see their 
enterprise as involving minutiae rather than grand theory, there have been no shortage of 
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historians who have sought to make bold, sweeping general statements, whether this be 
Thucydides’ record of the Peloponnesian Wars in which he aimed to reveal a record that 
would stand as a ‘possession for all time’, Arnold Toynbee’s conception of the telos of world 
history as governed by the rise and fall of great civilisations, or David Christian’s (2004) 
work on ‘big history’ which seeks to construct a ‘theory of everything’ grounded on the 
human propensity for collective learning. A substantial tranche of the history profession is 
engaged with ‘world history’, establishing large-scale narratives of periodisation and 
causation (e.g. McNeill, 2003), while a number of scholars who explicitly straddle the social 
science-history divide, such as Charles Tilly, Randall Collins and Michael Mann often 
describe their work as macro-history (e.g. Tilly, 1984). The Annales School of French 
historians, amongst them Fernand Braudel and Marc Bloch, were less concerned with the 
évenéments of historical detail than with the impact of large-scale conjunctural forces and, on 
an even bigger scale, the movement of environmental changes which took place over the 
longue-durée. As such, it is not possible to generate a hard-and-fast distinction between 





Second, and linked to this point, such an opening of any first-order distinction based on 
generalist social scientists and particularist historians indicates that there are not one, but 
many forms of historical research. Just as social science breaks down into macro and micro 
research, formal models and thick description, ideal theory and action-based accounts, so 
history too is home to numerous debates about methods, truth, levels of abstraction and the 
status of historical facts. For example, it is possible to discriminate between a 
‘correspondence’ view of history (associated with Ranke, Acton and Bury) in which the 
outside observer seeks to establish the ‘truth’ of historical facts and a ‘constructionist’ mode 
of history (associated with Oakeshott and Collingwood) which explores the ways in which 
the historian’s experience itself helps to construct historical knowledge. Or to take an other 
example, some thirty years ago, a surge of interest in social, economic and demographic 
history as inspired by Marx, and in cultural history as prefigured by Weber, generated a split 
within historical circles between ‘new history’ (a concern with what happened and how) and 
‘old history’ (a concern with why things happened and with what consequence) (Keene, 
                                                 
3
 This holds equally from the other side of the lumper/splitter divide – there are many social 
scientific approaches which engage systematically with micro-phenomena, not least 
ethnomethodology and micro-economics. 
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2008). The subsequent ‘history wars’ replicated social scientific debates about method, the 
notion of science and the importance, or otherwise, of the fact/value distinction.
4
 Indeed, this 
conflict pitched traditionalists against radical historicists in ways which would be familiar to 
the vast majority of social scientists. Given this, it is worth probing a little deeper in order to 
test the possibilities – and limits – of the relationship between history and social science. By 
doing so, it becomes clear that many of the shorthands employed to distinguish history from 
social science are canards, used to establish and police disciplinary homeland security rather 
than derived from any first-order intellectual requirements. 
 
 
Beyond the eternal divide: Context, narrative, eventfulness, ideal-typification 
 
So far, this essay has argued that historians and social scientists tend to talk past each other 
(when they bother to engage in conversation at all). Each has played their part in fostering a 
disciplinary partition based on apparently eternal distinctions about appropriate levels of 
abstraction, degrees of causal determinacy and ‘proper’ methods. Whether understood as 
scripture vs. butterfly or as lumper vs. splitter, the result of this failure to communicate is 
second-order noise masquerading as first-order debate. This section of the essay provides a 
more measured assessment of the relationship between social science and history based on 
four mechanisms – context, narrative, eventfulness and ideal-typification. The first two are 
drawn primarily from history; the latter from social science.
5
 By highlighting these 
commonly used tools, it becomes clear that beneath the surface of disciplinary parlour-games 
lie a number of ways in which history and social science are co-implicated. As such, 
assumptions of an eternal divide between history and social science melts away. Neither 
social science nor history requires a particular level of abstraction, mode of explanation, 
methodology or epistemology. Rather, apparently essential differences between the two 
enterprises – nomothetic vs. idiographic, parsimony vs. complexity, general vs. particular – 
have been constructed from the requirements of disciplinary gatekeeping rather than any 
hard-and-fast intellectual distinctiveness. Problematising the history/theory binary means 
                                                 
4
 As Eddie Keene (2008: 385) points out, just as Hedley Bull and other members of the 
English School were critiquing the ‘scientific method’ associated with behaviouralist IR, so 
historians were increasingly ‘scientising’ their discipline.  
5
 This move is not meant to reproduce the social science/history binary by choosing two 
wagers from either side of the ‘eternal divide’, but rather intended to demonstrate the co-
implication of history and social science as mutually reinforcing sensibilities.  
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acknowledging that history is a social science just as social science, including IR, is 
necessarily historical.  
 
Context 
At first glance, ‘context’ does not appear to be the most obvious place by which to establish 
shared focal points between history and social science. Indeed, the modern study of history is 
often associated with figures such as Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke who sought 
to establish history not as a narrative of specific situations but as a truth-revealing science. 
Ranke, for example, was broadly indifferent to the context in which historical events took 
place and in ‘stuff’ which occurred outside the realm of high-politics. Rather, his concern was 
to generate a legion of well-trained archivists capable of trawling documents-of-state in order 
to reveal the true motivations of the great and the good. As Ranke (in Franzoni, 2005: 439) 
wrote, ‘A closed archive is still absolutely a virgin. I long for the moment I shall have access 
to her and make my declaration of love, whether she is pretty or not.’ Or to put this in less 
odious language: quod not est in charta, non est in mundo (what is not in the document is not 
in the world).  
 
The past two centuries has seen a reduction in Ranke’s influence on historical research, albeit 
with a fair few lurches along the way (cf. the influence of neo-Rankereans such as Geoffrey 
Elton, 1967). Perhaps most crucial here is the emergence of ‘history from below’ – the 
writing of history from the perspective of those who are at once both its principal agents and, 
just as commonly, its main victims (e.g. Hill, 1940; Thompson, 1966; Rediker, 2008). 
Advocates of history-from-below argue that history cannot be told merely from a (neo) 
Rankerean focus on truth-as-high-politics-revealed-by-official-sources. Rather, as E.P. 
Thompson (1966: 12) passionately argues in the preface to his seminal study of the 
emergence of industrial capitalism in England:  
 
I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-
loom weaver, the ‘Utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna 
Southcott from the enormous condescension of posterity. Their crafts and traditions 
may have been dying. Their hostility to the new industrialism may have been 
backward-looking. Their communitarian ideals may have been fantasies. Their 
insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these 
times of acute social disturbance, and we did not. Their aspirations were valid in 
terms of their own experience; and, if they were casualties of history, they remain, 
condemned in their own lives, as casualties.  
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A commitment to history from below does not just require a reconstruction of what it means 
to be a valid historical subject; it also entails a broadening of historical method towards oral 
testimony and biography, and away from ‘documentary fetishism’ (Evans, 1997). Equally 
importantly, this shift in the status of primary materials has gone hand-in-hand with a more 
widespread interrogation of the status of historical facts themselves. In the early part of the 
twentieth-century, Carl Becker (1955) made the case for seeing historical facts less as 
inviolate truths than as symbolic, contextual constellations made up from a thousand or more 
discarded events which both surrounded and sustained them. R.G. Collingwood (1994) 
argued that history revealed little more than the mind of the historian, promoting a form of 
neo-Hegelian ‘historical imagination’ in which history became a history of ideas and 
historical research the re-enactment of past thought. And despite a post-World War Two turn 
towards cliometrics in the work of Geoffrey Barraclough and others, much history during the 
Cold War seemed more in tune with E.H. Carr’s (1967) desire to see history as a ‘selective 
system’, an inherently social process best considered as a dialogue between present and past 
societies.  
 
For Carr, the first step in studying history was to study both the historian and the broader 
context (the social, political and economic environment) within which they carried out their 
research and within which historical facts were accumulated. For Carr, the fact that historical 
relics could not speak for themselves but were embedded within broader social matrices 
meant that there could be no absolute truth about the past in the way promoted by Ranke and 
his fellow travellers. Rather, for Carr, historical explanations were inherently approximate. 
This did not mean the end of adequate explanation; the conversation between past and present 
contained within Carr’s vision of historical method tasked the historian with differentiating 
between significant and accidental causes, providing intelligible meaning in a world of 
incessant change, and remaining open to new interpretations of a subject.  
 
Carr’s understanding of the construction of historical knowledge as a fundamentally social 
process rooted in interrogation of the multiple contexts within which historical knowledge is 
produced acts as the first step towards shared conceptualisations of history and social science. 
Carr saw historical research as concerned with adjudication between rival interpretations 
based on an open conversation – and contestation – between facts, sources and scholarship. 
As such, he favoured a historical epistemology in which history was not studied merely by 
the uncovering of new facts but by immersion in the ‘knowledge cultures’, modes of thinking 
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and reasoning practices which emerged in specific contexts and which helped to translate 
historical materials into social facts. Carr’s enquiry points to an understanding of history as 
‘recollecting the past’, the study of events which are always part of broader structures of 
meaning. This signifies a move away from the ‘context of justification’ as a means of 
discriminating between rival historical interpretations towards what Margaret Somers (1996) 
calls the ‘context of discovery’ – a focus on how historiography itself enables findings to 
emerge. History is always viewed from the vantage point of the present – we are, as Friedrich 
Kratochwil (2006) acknowledges, ‘historical beings’ in that we are situated in broader 
milieus within which we conduct a dialogue between present and other times. And, in turn, 
this lends itself towards the generation of ‘working truths’ and ‘situational certainties’ bound 
by time and space contexts (Kratochwil, 2006).  
 
Although this point may seem obvious, it actually involves a substantial reorientation of 
(some) social science away from a view of science as equivalent to physics or mathematics 
and towards ‘historical sciences’ such as biology or geology which are more suited to the 
complexities of world politics. Although biology and geology work within broad overarching 
paradigms – natural selection and plate tectonics respectively – it is only through comparative 
analysis in which processes are traced, patterns deduced and taxonomies constructed that 
knowledge is seen to accumulate. In this way, historical sciences knot together initial causes, 
environmental niches, local conditions and nonlinear interactions into ‘impressionistic 
pictures’ which identify trends and connect chains of contingencies both logically and 
consistency. These ‘plotlines’, in turn, act as a means for generating scholarly debate about 
contextually-oriented interpretations (Bernstein et al, 2007). The result is a search for 
‘nonlinear confluence’ and ‘plausible causal assertions’, understood as the ways in which 
historical events and processes conjoin in order to produce particular causal chains within 
bounded social domains (Lebow, 2010). 
 
Perhaps the closest approximation to this form of ‘historical science’ in IR comes via 
association with the Cambridge School of historians as represented by figures such as 
Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock and John Dunn (on the Cambridge School and IR, see Bell, 
2003; Reus Smit, 2008). Skinner (2002) and other members of the Cambridge School attack 
the Rankerean notion of a historical text speaking for itself and of history being concerned 
with ‘fundamental concepts’, ‘timeless elements’, ‘stable vocabularies’ and the like, arguing 
that we can only know history from our own times. As such, for Skinner, reading the past 
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requires an avoidance of the twin dangers of parochialism and anachronism which transplant 
concepts (such as balance of power) and viewpoints (such as political realism) to contexts 
where they are inappropriate. In a similar vein, Skinner critiques ‘the mythology of 
doctrines’: the tendency to find advocates of a position in earlier times and earlier places. 
Hence, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes et al are taken to be part of a realist canon not 
because they would have recognised modern usage of the term – or necessarily have related 
to contemporary language games, concepts and ideas – but because we find affinities between 
their work and our times. In short, we read us in them. For Skinner, the predilection for ‘text 
without context’ generates an overly neat packaging of history, generating a mythology of 
coherence which makes ideas appear translatable beyond their particular utterance. As such, 
Skinner is dismissive of the fetish towards seeing ‘history as scripture’ – if scholars have a 
particular view to peddle, they will find evidence to support it. For Skinner, this is not history 
but mythology. And it is how much IR theory approaches the subject of history. 
 
Skinner’s way out of the ‘history as scripture’ quagmire comes via asking what an author is 
trying to do when they write a particular text, in other words to seek out their intentions. 
Importantly, Skinner is concerned more with intellectual and linguistic contexts than he is 
with establishing the political, economic and social constraints on historical knowledge. In 
other words, historical research should seek out the uses, practices and performances of texts 
(‘utterances’) in order to understand the ‘internal tradition’ within which they are articulated. 
In interrogating historical texts and writers, we need to ‘see things their way’ (2002: 42). 
Such a viewpoint places Skinner squarely within the tradition of historical research outlined 
above – the attempt to move away from the testing of abstract lessons and anachronistic 
fallacies towards acceptance of the contextual limits of both history and our understanding of 
it. Indeed, such a move allows social scientific research to move away from abstractions 
towards explanation of specific historical processes, building from identification of processes 
which take place within time-space-linguistic contexts towards establishing the extent to 
which comparable processes occur in alternative milieus. As such, it is rooted in meso-level, 
mid-range theorising, occupying the messy eclectic centre of social (and historical) theory by 
combining analytical rigour with conceptual sophistication and empirical reach. 
 
Eventfulness 
Historians, it is often claimed, act as process tracers par excellence, establishing the ways in 
events become linked, threaded and sequenced in broader configurations. Although, as 
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William Sewell (2005) notes, historians often begin with the facts of contingency, complexity 
and causal heterogeneity, few make the case against there being significance to the sequence 
within which events take place, or that the context within which they occur is insignificant. In 
other words, accepting the contingency of events does not preclude these being placed in 
broader analytical narratives, for example via studying the ways in which certain practices 
emerge and become enduring. In this sense, Sewell argues, we need two forms of research: 
synchronic study of the form, content and structure of social relations; and diachronic study 
of how these social relations emerge, are patterned, reproduced and transformed. As Sewell 
points out, even events which appear to be new are themselves part of broader dynamics. As 
such, events themselves can be seen as theorisable categories, part of broader sequences 
which reproduce and transform existing patterns of social relations. Events have cascading, 
sequential effects in that they both break and reproduce existing formations. Sewell uses the 
example of the fall of the Bastille to illustrate his point. The importance of the storming of the 
Bastille in 1789 was that it was imbued with significance ‘beyond itself’. In other words, the 
event contained a recognition within broader political and cultural fields which broke existing 
configurations and reconstructed categories of meaning, amongst them notions of ‘people’ 
and ‘revolution’. And it is not difficult to find contemporaneous events which contain 
comparable effect: 1989, 9/11 and more.  
 
As Andrew Abbott (1995) argues, events and processes are connected in multiple, 
overlapping ways: there is no unremitting contingency to these interactions. Rather, 
regularities emerge in certain contexts, constituting assemblages in which sites of difference 
are yoked, forming edges and boundaries around social formations. In turn, these relatively 
fixed patterns of interactions are reproduced in ways which transform them into social facts, 
entities with a coherent, if always somewhat contingent, form. Although these configurations 
are always open to contestation, they constitute relatively stable sites for the development of 
what Duncan Bell (2009: 19) calls ‘creole communities’ or ‘contact languages’ between 
social science and history. Indeed, it could be argued that a ‘historical ontology’ rests on 
study of the emergence, durability and diffusion of these ‘things’, whether understood as 
concepts or institutions (Hacking, 2002). There are a number of examples of how this plays 
out in practice ranging from the emergence of government bureaucracies to the development 
of professions and academic disciplines. And in IR, this form of research lends itself to study 
of how rhetorical strategies frame events, enabling some policy avenues and closing down 
others (e.g. Jackson & Krebs, 2007), or how transnational religious networks mobilize around 
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events in order to disrupt modes of rule and reconstruct others (e.g. Nexon, 2009). In short, 
an ‘eventful’ approach allows researchers to see how historical events enable social 
formations to emerge, reproduce, transform and, potentially, break down.  
 
If the first step, therefore, in understanding the mutual implication of history and social 
science is to recognise that temporality is social and, therefore, rooted in contexts which are 
examinable via social scientific enquiry, the second step is to see events as theorisable in that 
certain ‘happenings’ have outcomes which can be studied via the ways in which social 
formations emerge, become institutionalised and change. As such, history contains a social 
logic, a process of ‘eventing’ in which moments in time take on relatively stable shapes 
drawn from the interaction between events and the repertoires of meaning brought to bear on 
them (Jackson, 2006). Of course, such a move is never complete – alternative readings are 
always available and always present. But nevertheless, historical events are interpreted within 
relatively contained plot structures drawn from the intersection of events and the milieus 
within which they take place. In this sense, historical accounts contain a sense of 
‘followability’: a ‘narrative intelligibility’ in which contingency is conjoined with an account 
of adequate causation (Gallie, 1964). 
 
Narrative 
As Hidemi Suganami (1999; 2008) notes, historical accounts tend to contain three 
dimensions: chance (contingency), agency (volition) and mechanism (causation). Although 
social scientists often focus on mechanism and historians on agency and chance, this does not 
make the social world beyond the comprehension of either set of researchers. In fact, both 
historians and social scientists are concerned with establishing ‘causal narratives’, structured 
stories which explain events and make them intelligible to others. By focusing on particular 
moments, events and ‘critical junctures’, it is possible to attain an explanation of the 
movement of historical processes alongside broader analytical wagers. This is the method 
employed by Michael Mann (1986) in constructing his account of world historical 
development and it is how a number of historical sociologists have defended their interest in 
periods of rapid change such as organic crises, revolutions and wars. Concentrating on these 
‘neo-episodic moments’, it is argued, illuminates the ways in which moments of temporal 
heterogeneity morph into fields of ‘ruptural unity’ (Steinmetz, 2010). Such research is guided 
not by prefigured analytical boundaries, but by empirical puzzles regarding how certain 
practices come into being, how they change and how they break down. The result is a 
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figurational approach to causation, focusing on how historically specific outcomes are the 
results of processes which are themselves drawn from the complex intersection of events and 
context (Elias, 2000).  
 
Regardless of sometimes stark disagreements over epistemology, subject matter and 
sensibility,
6
 most historians see one of their core tasks as ‘emplotment’ – the process by 
which events are given a sense of order and hierarchy. To put this simply, historians may tell 
stories, but most consider their stories to be superior to others (Goodin and Tilly, 2006). And 
although they may be comfortable with the world of alternative futures and unintended 
consequences, nevertheless most historians generate a logic to their explanations in which 
ordering events into causal narratives plays a central role. In other words, there may be 
multiple histories out there, but some histories prove to be stickier than others.  
 
This focus on the ordering of events into intelligible stories provides the kernels of a third 
way in which social science and history are co-implicated: narrative. The role of narrative in 
historical research is well chronicled. Some thirty years ago, Lawrence Stone (1979) 
discerned a ‘revival of narrative’, a trend most evident in the work of metahistorians such as 
Hayden White (1975) who, in turn, drew heavily on figures such Paul Ricoeur and Northrop 
Frye. Ricoeur traced the idea of history as emplotment to Aristotle’s Poetics, seeing narrative 
as a means of generating ‘concordance in discordance’ (order in chaos). White took this 
argument on a step, perceiving emplotment as the means by which historians mediated 
between their fields of enquiry, the records they encountered, existing historical accounts and 
their audiences. White’s most radical move was to claim that research of this kind was a 
‘poetic act’ in which historians discerned plot structures largely on aesthetic and normative 
grounds. As such, historical work developed its ‘explanatory effect’ via a three-dimensional 
analysis: aesthetic perception (emplotment), cognitive operation (argument) and ideological 
prescription (implication). In this way, White (1975: 30) argued, ‘the historian confronts the 
historical field in much the same way as the grammatician confronts a new language.’ The 
task of the historian, for White, was not to produce a final, exhaustive reading of the 
historical record – indeed, he recognised that there would always be ‘surplus meanings’ to 
historical texts (Jenkins, 1991). Rather, historical narratives performed roles of knowledge 
                                                 
6
 A selection of readings on these ‘stark disagreements’ includes: Bloch, 1962; Carr, 1967; 
Elton, 1969; Jenkins, 1991; Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, 1995; Evans, 1997; Marwick, 2001; 
Cannadine, 2002; Tosh, 2006. 
 22 
construction, revision and destruction (of existing accounts) which served to render the social 
world both ordered and meaningful.  
 
White’s argument takes the debate on narrative to its extreme – his understanding of the 
nature of history, the status of historical knowledge and the vocation of the historian have 
prompted considerable debate, much of it critical (e.g. Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, 1995; 
Marwick, 2001). But the intricacies of this debate – diverting though they may be – do not 
appreciably affect the argument being made here. More important is the sense in which 
narrative as a social process can illuminate links between history and social science. Even in 
White’s account is a sense in which emplotment contains a social logic in which history is 
less removed from the social sciences than part of a broader panorama of story-telling 
disciplines. Perhaps, therefore, it is worth acknowledging that just as ‘theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981: 128), so history too is always for someone and 
for some purpose. History is not a flat realm of incontrovertible facts for theorists to mine. 
The same root-and-branch questions over the status of knowledge claims, the value 
orientations of the researcher, and the ontological facticity – or not – of the social world 
which have bedevilled social scientists over the years have also been the subject of sustained 
debate by historians. As such, history should not be seen as some kind of subordinate 
occupation. Rather, via an understanding of the importance of narrative, whether understood 
as an analytical tool or as an emplotment device, in all social scientific stories, it is clear that 
history has far more in common with social science than is often considered to be the case.  
 
Ideal-typification 
A focus on events, context and narrative in the historical formation of social facts constitutes 
important points of co-implication between social science and history. After all, it is not often 
that researchers query the actuality of a specific event; rather, disagreements arise from the 
status or meaning given to that event. As such, much of both social science and history can be 
seen as forms of research which attempt to derive connections beyond the lurches of 
historical events, yet which do not contain a pre-determined script within them. One way of 
conceptualising such a craft is through the construction of what Max Weber (1949) 
evocatively called ‘thought pictures’ (Gedankenbilder), ideal-types which serve as heuristic 
devices for the examination of empirical reality. For Weber, ideal-types served as expository 
tools by which to clarify history, organising certain aspects of social life into internally 
consistent, logical constructs. As such, ideal-types were tasked with the ‘analytical ordering 
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of empirical social reality’ (Weber, 1949: 61), a key aspect of the ‘empirical science of 
concrete reality’ (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) which Weber developed.  
 
For Weber, ideal-types served as ‘simplifications for the purposes of increasing 
comprehension’ (Jackson, 2010: ch. 5). Researchers adopting this methodological tool ‘trace 
and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate 
historically specific outcomes in particular cases’ (Jackson, 2010: ch. 5). Importantly, ideal-
typifications are not meant to represent ‘actual history’ but to act as simplified maps of 
historical reality with the goal of specifying causal configurations which, in turn, act as 
‘portable knowledge’ in alternative cases. In short, ideal-types make intelligible the myriad of 
interactions which take place in historical processes – they are a method for exploring the 
casual relationships contained in historically specific configurations and, potentially, tools of 
comparison beyond these specific instantiations, something Weber made apparent in 
numerous studies, not least his comparison of world religions. In this way, ideal-typification 
isolates key features of historical events and processes, highlights their most important 
features and, in turn, examines their salience in alternative arenas. The result, Weber argued, 
was a means of tacking effectively between empirical material, conceptual abstractions and 
causal explanations, as Michael Mann (1986) puts it, ‘carrying out a constant conversation 
between the evidence and one’s theory’.  
 
There are a number of existing traditions and cognate enterprises which feed into – and 
illustrate the potency of – this type of research. For example, there is the emergence of what 
Andrew Bennett and Alan George (2005) call ‘typological theory’ – the development of 
contingent generalizations which begin with events and which understand that some 
occurrences take on path dependencies which can be effectively traced. The task for such 
research is to identify these events and the complex causal mechanisms which flow from 
them, examining how they parse into specific configurations and causal sequences. This form 
of research – what we might call ‘nomothetic history’– begins with the identification of 
specific causal mechanisms in time and place allied to how such typifications operate across 
time and place. Such research fits squarely within the tradition of ‘classical social analysis’ 
defined by C. Wright Mills (1959) as being mutually occupied by concerns of structure, 
history and biography. For Mills, interest in structure arises from the fact that human 
behavior is always involved in, and shaped by, particular patterns of social relationships. 
History adds the sense that these social structures are always specific to given times and 
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places, that they vary enormously from one period or setting to another, and that they are 
themselves subject to change over time. Finally, biography connects these larger-scale 
phenomena of structure and change to the experiences of individuals – revealing how their 
lives are shaped by broader social and historical processes and how their agency, in turn, 
effects these processes. By triangulating these three registers, Mills concluded, ‘classical 
social analysis’ produced an idiom of understanding so rich and compelling that it provided 
the ‘common denominator’ for the modern social sciences. Examples of this form of 
‘concretely embedded research’ are many, ranging from Michael Mann’s (1986) sweeping 
account of world historical development to IR studies of the global genesis of the modern 
states-system (Hobson, 2004). These accounts are sensitive to historical particularity and 
complexity, while retaining a social scientific commitment to ‘systematic inquiry designed to 
produce factual knowledge’ (Jackson, 2010). As such, they are exemplars of what we might 
call ‘rich parsimony’. Importantly, this research is rooted in concern not just for the logical 
ordering of historical events, but with how intuition, imagination and judgement play major 
roles in deriving analytical narratives. In short, ideal-typification represents a ‘science of 




Beyond the eternal divide 
 
Ideal-typification enables a form of research far removed from the siren songs of history as 
either ‘scripture’ or ‘butterfly’. As such, alongside the other tools outlined in this essay, it 
serves as a vibrant site of connection between history and social science. To date, both sides 
of the imaginary, but powerfully constructed, ‘eternal divide’ have been reticent at engaging 
fully with the other. As a result, a number of unhelpful – at times false – dichotomies have 
been established, essentialised distinctions that this essay has sought to critique. Although 
history and social science are necessarily co-implicated in each other, this relationship is 
often occluded by a focus on secondary differences of method, sensibility and aesthetics. And 
much of the time, these second-order canards are granted the status of insurmountable 
differences. If we are to make claims which avoid such a reliance on false binaries, we 
require tools of mediation between abstractions and empirics, and approaches which 
consciously incorporate both the sociological imagination (Mills, 1959) and the historian’s 
craft (Bloch, 1964). This essay has taken a first cut at this task via a focus on context, 
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eventfulness, narrative and ideal-typification. Such an exercise is not meant to be exhaustive 
and, no doubt, many other fertile points of contact exist.
7
 But whichever tools are employed, 
it is clear that the relationship between social science and history is not one of essentialised 
incommensurability, but rich in creative possibilities. Much of the time, social scientists and 
historians converge in terms of their modes of enquiry and tools of explanation, albeit while 
simultaneously appearing to hide this synergy.  
 
The argument here, therefore, is that history and social science should not be considered as 
autonomous enterprises separated by virtue of distinct orientations, approaches and subject 
matters, but as a common enterprise. By focusing on events, by ordering and sequencing 
these events into intelligible narratives, recognising how people act within certain contexts, 
contexts that can only be discerned from the vantage points of researchers’ historically 
situated positions, history does not abhor social science – rather, it requires it. As such, the 
choice is not one between a historical enterprise which can do with or without theory, but 
acceptance of the fact that history is a social science. It is an approach which emplots, 
narrates and analyses causal stories. In this way, history takes its place as an indispensable 
part of the panoply of social sciences just as social science appears as one amongst many 
story-telling enterprises. Both are necessarily implicated in each other, something made clear 
by a focus on context, eventfulness, narrative and ideal-typification. For the IR researcher, 
there are at least two steps which follow from this focus on shared ground: first, awareness of 
the way in which diverse theoretical schools interpret, assess and adjudicate a particular 
historical subject matter; and second, maintaining an eye for variance, conflict and 
heterogeneous opinion at least as much as convergence, clusters and patterns of received 
wisdom (Lustick, 1996). In short, researchers should look to history in order to be wrong, to 
look for interpretations, surprises and contradictions which do not fit with prevailing 
theoretical explanations (Trachtenberg, 2006). One method of potential utility here is the use 
of counterfactuals. As Ned Lebow (2010) points out, counterfactual work is useful in its 
                                                 
7
 Another possibility, for example, is a genealogical approach most commonly associated 
with Michel Foucault and, in IR, with Jens Bartleson (1995). Bartleson’s ‘episodic narrative’ 
weaves together ‘families of statements’ about sovereignty in order to unravel the ways in 
which taken-for-granted notions of sovereignty have, in turn, been premised on historical 
traditions, concepts and practices. These ‘systems of discourses’ serve as ‘semi-permeable 
membranes’ between the past, present and future. As should be obvious, such an approach 
bears a close resemblance to the type of research favoured in this piece.   
 26 
capacity for researchers to go ‘beyond themselves’, breaking the spell of tendencies to see 
history as closed rather than open, and in Humean rather than nonlinear terms.  
 
Certainly, counterfactual readings serve as powerful forms of demystification, helping to 
remove forms of cognitive bias which tend to see history as post-factum determinant rather 
than as context-bound narrative. And moving away from this need for ‘historical closure’ – 
our apparent requirement for order and predictability – serves to empower researchers by 
realising the limits of our claims about the social world. Perhaps, then, what is required is a 
degree of humility about what we can know, an understanding that theoretical explanations 
are always partial, provisional and contained within tightly bound historical domains. Big 
events don’t require big causes – rather history is best seen as a conjuncture of chance, 
agency and confluence which comes together in particular sequences which, in turn, can be 
usefully and powerfully emplotted (Lebow, 2010). The results of such an exercise would not, 
therefore, seek either total explanation nor the maintenance of a Maginot Line between 
history and IR, but the generation of ‘analytical narratives’ which accept that temporality is 
social, events are theorisable, and that narrativity is an indispensable part to causal stories, 
best captured by varieties of ideal-typical research. History does not belong to a single 
theoretical approach in IR: history comes in plural modes rather than in singular form. 
Indeed, history is, in many ways, the lowest common denominator of theoretical approaches 
within the discipline. As such, it is particularly important to establish precisely what we mean 
by ‘history in IR’ – the scholar’s choice of historical sensibility is, in turn, constitutive of the 
way in which they theorise the international realm. Accordingly, if we are all historians, at 
least on some level, we are differentiated not simply by our choice of theory but also by our 
selection of a particular historical mode of explanation. And in developing this selection, it 
should become clear that both social science and history form part of a single intellectual 
journey, one in which both are permanently in view and in which neither serves as the under-





Abbott, Andrew (1995), ‘Things of Boundaries’, Social Research 62(4) (1995): 857-881. 
 
Appleby, Joyce, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob (1995), Telling the Truth about History 
(New York: W.W. Norton). 
 
Ashley, Richard (1989), ‘Living on Border Lines’, in James Der Derian and Michael J. 
Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations (New York: Lexington). 
 
Bartleson, Jens (1995), A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
 
Becker, Carl (1955), ‘What are Historical Facts?’ The Western Political Quarterly 8(3): 327-
340.  
 
Bell, Duncan (2003), ‘Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History’, Review of 
International Studies 29(1): 151-160. 
 
Bell, Duncan (2009), ‘Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond’, International 
Affairs 85(1): 3-22. 
 
Bernstein, Steven et al (2007), ‘Social Science as Case-Based Diagnostics’, in Richard Ned 
Lebow and Mark Irving Lichbach (eds.), Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and 
International Relations, pp. 229-260 (New York: Palgrave). 
 
Bloch, Marc (1964), The Historian’s Craft (New York: Vintage). 
 
Buzan, Barry (2004), From International to World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (1996), ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural Realism 
Meets World History,’ European Journal of International Relations 2(4): 403-438. 
 
Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2001), International Systems in World History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Campbell, David (1998), Writing Security (London: University of Minnesota Press). 
 
Cannadine, David (ed.) (2002), What is History Now? (London: Palgrave). 
 
Carr, E.H. (1967), What is History? (London: Vintage).  
 
Christian, David (2004), Maps of Time (Berkeley: University of California Press). 
 
Collingwood, R.G. (1994), The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Cox, Robert (1981), ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders’, Millennium 10(2): 126-155. 
 
 28 
Eckstein, Arthur (2005), Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome 
(Berkeley: University of California Press). 
 
Elias, Norbert (2000), The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman (2001), ‘Negotiating International History and 
Politics,’ in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.), Bridges and Boundaries, pp. 1-
36 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
 
Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman (2008), ‘The Role of History in International 
Relations’, Millennium 37(2): 357-364. 
 
Elton, Geoffrey (1969), The Practice of History (London: Fontana). 
 
Elton, Geoffrey (1991), Return to Essentials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Evans, Richard (1997), In Defence of History (London: Granta). 
 
Franzoni, Robert (2005), ‘Historical Knowledge and Evidence’, in Robert Goodin and 
Charles Tilly (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 438-453 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis (1996), ‘History, Science and the Study of International Relations’, in 
Ngaire Woods (ed.), Explaining International Relations Since 1945, pp. 32-48 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis (2001), ‘In Defence of Particular Generalization’, in Colin Elman and 
Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.), Bridges and Boundaries, pp. 301-326 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press). 
 
Gallie, W.B. (1964), ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, in W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and 
Historical Understanding, pp. 157-191 (London: Chatto & Windus).  
 
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
 
Gilpin, Robert (1981), War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981) 
 
Goodin, Robert and Charles Tilly (2006), ‘It Depends’, in Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 3-34 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
 
Hacking, Ian (2002), Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
 
Hall, Rodney Bruce and Friedrich Kratochwil (1993), ‘Medieval Tales: Neorealist “Science” 
and the Abuse of History’, International Organization 47(3): 479-492. 
 
Hall, Ian (2002), ‘History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and 
International Relations’, Review of International Studies 28(4): 719-736. 
 29 
 
Hill, Christopher (1940), The English Revolution 1640 (London: Lawrence and Wishart). 
 
Hobden, Stephen and John Hobson (eds.) (2002), Historical Sociology of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
Hobson, John (2004), The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Holden, Gerard (2002), “Who Contextualises the Contextualisers?” Review of International 
Studies 28(2): 253-270. 
 
Isacoff, Jonathon B. (2002), ‘On the Historical Imagination of International Relations’, 
Millennium 31(3): 603-626. 
 
Jackson, Patrick (2006), ‘The Present as History’, in Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook on Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 490-505 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
 
Jackson, Patrick (2010), The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (London: 
Routledge). 
 
Jackson, Patrick and Ronald Krebs (2007), ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric’, European Journal of International Relations 13(1): 35-66. 
 
Jenkins, Keith (1991), Re-Thinking History (London: Routledge).  
 
Keene, Eddie (2008), ‘The English School and British Historians’, Millennium 37(2): 381-
393. 
 
Keohane, Robert (1984), After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2006), ‘History, Action and Identity’, European Journal of 
International Relations 12(1): 5-29. 
 
Lebow, Richard Ned (2010), Forbidden Fruit (New Haven: Princeton University Press). 
 
Linklater, Andrew and Hidemi Suganami (2007), The English School of International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Lustick, Ian (1996), ‘History, Historiography and Political Science’, American Political 
Science Review 90(3): 605-618. 
 
Mann, Michael (1986), The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
 
Martin, Lisa (1992), Coercive Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Marwick, Arthur (2001), The New Nature of History (London: Palgrave). 
 
 30 
McNeill, William (2003), The Human Web (New York: W.W. Norton). 
 
Mearsheimer, John (1993), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton). 
 
Mills, C. W. (1959), The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Nexon, Daniel (2009), The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Nisbet, Robert (1969) Social Change and History (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Novick, Peter (1988), That Noble Dream (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
Rediker, Marcus (2008), The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: Penguin). 
 
Reus-Smit, Christian (2008), ‘Reading History through Constructivist Eyes’, Millennium 
37(2): 395-414. 
 
Robinson, William (2003), Transnational Conflicts (London: Verso). 
 
Ruggie, John (1986) ,‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Politics’, in Robert 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 131-
157. 
 
Schroeder, Paul (1994), ‘Historical Reality and Neo-Realist Theory’, International Security 
19(1): 108-148. 
 
Sewell, William (2005), Logics of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).  
 
Skinner, Quentin (2003), Visions of Politics Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Smith, Thomas (1999), History and International Relations (London: Routledge).  
 
Somers, Margaret (1996), ‘Where is Sociology after the Historic Turn?’ in Terrence J. 
McDonald, The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, pp. 53-90 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press). 
 
Steinmetz, George (2010), ‘Bourdieu, Historicity and IR’, Cultural Sociology 10(2), 2010: In 
Press. 
 
Stone, Lawrence (1979), ‘The Revival of Narrative’, Past and Present 85(1): 3-24.  
 
Suganami, Hidemi (1999), ‘Agents, Structures, Narratives’, European Journal of 
International Relations 5(3): 365-386. 
 
Suganami, Hidemi (2008), ‘Narrative Explanation and International Relations’, Millennium 
38(3): 327-356. 
 
Thompson, E.P. (1966), The Making of the English Working Class (London: Vintage).  
 
 31 
Tilly, Charles (1984), Big Processes, Large Structures, Huge Comparisons (New York: 
Russell Sage). 
 
Tosh, John (2006), The Pursuit of History (New York: Longman). 
 
Trachtenberg, Marc (2006), The Craft of International History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Vaughan-Williams, Nick (2005), ‘International Relations and the “Problem of History”’, 
Millennium 34(1): 115-136. 
 
Walker, Rob (1988), ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations’, 
Millennium 18(2): 163-182. 
 
Weber, Max (1949), The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press). 
 
White, Hayden (1975), Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).  
 
Wight, Martin (1966), ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, in Herbert Butterfield and 
Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 17-34 (London: Allen & Unwin). 
